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BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
(1993 as amended), which grants the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over 
"cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court." This appeal is 
taken from the final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, presiding. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this brief: 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it granted Defendant 
Kevin Roseman1 s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment? 
a. Did the trial court properly determine as a matter of law that 
Defendant Roseman was not negligent? 
b. Did the trial court properly determine as a matter of law that 
Defendant Roseman was without notice and therefore did not breach a duty of care 
owed to Plaintiffs? 
In reviewing a case which has been disposed of by summary judgment, the 
appellate court must accept the facts and all inferences fairly arising from them in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment has been granted. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). The appellate court will 
affirm only where it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to any issues of material 
fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended to the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 808 
P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Because a challenge to summary judgment presents only conclusions of law for review, 
the appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions for correctness without according 
them any deference. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County. 811 P.2d 
184, 192 (Utah 1991). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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Any statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions relevant to the disposition of 
this appeal are set forth in the text or addenda of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 19, 1991, Paulette Balle, deceased, was fatally injured when the 
automobile she was driving collided with a horse on SR-73, west of Lehi, in Utah 
County, State of Utah. The Plaintiffs and Appellants in the present matter are the 
surviving husband and seven (7) surviving daughters, four (4) of whom are minors. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants filed their First Amended Complaint in the Fourth 
District Court alleging negligence against Defendant Bryce Thomas. (R. 15) Shortly 
thereafter, Plaintiffs were able to conduct sufficient discovery to determine that 
Defendant Thomas should not be a party to the action. Plaintiffs consequently stipulated 
to the dismissal of all claims against Defendant Thomas and he is therefore, not a party to 
this appeal. (R. 26) 
On August 31, 1992, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in the 
Fourth District Court against Defendants Kevin Roseman and Quinn Erickson alleging 
negligence on the part of Defendants as the proximate cause of the collision fatally 
injuring Paulette Balle. (R. 33) Upon court hearing and approval Plaintiffs have settled 
all claims against Defendant Erickson. (R. 170) Consequently, the remaining dispute 
only involves Defendant and Appellee Kevin Roseman, the owner of the horse allegedly 
involved in the accident. 
After some discovery had occurred, Defendant Roseman filed his first Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. The court denied Defendants Motion reasoning that it could not 
rule as a matter of law that Defendant Roseman did not breach his duty of care to the 
deceased. (R. 136) The court found that Plaintiffs raised genuine issues of material fact 
regarding Defendant's alleged negligence that precluded the granting of summary 
judgment. (R. 136) 
After both parties had completed additional discovery, Defendant Roseman 
renewed his Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 172) Upon oral argument and at the 
conclusion of the hearing on the Motion, the court determined as a matter of law that 
Defendant Roseman was not negligent. (R. 294) Additionally, the court concluded that 
assuming arguendo, that Defendant Roseman was negligent, he had no notice of a duty of 
care and therefore, without notice, there could be no breach of duty. (R. 294) The court 
issued an Order of Judgment granting Defendant Rosemanfs Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs1 Complaint with prejudice on the merits. 
This appeal followed. 
FACTS 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as required by the standard of 
review, the simple facts of this case are as follows. On November 19, 1991, Paulette 
Balle, deceased, was fatally injured when the automobile she was driving collided with a 
horse on SR-73, west of Lehi, in Utah County, State of Utah. On the date of the accident, 
Defendant and Appellee Kevin Roseman owned a horse that was boarded on the property 
of his brother-in-law, Defendant Quinn Erickson. Roseman last saw his horse "in the 
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first week or two of November" of 1991. (R. 227) She was last seen by him on the 
Erickson property. (R. 223) Roseman did not sell the horse, she "just disappeared." (R. 
224) When shown a photograph of the dead horse involved in the accident, Roseman 
stated that the markings on the dead horse were "similar" to the markings on his horse and 
that there was nothing in the photograph that would lead him to think the dead horse was 
not his horse. (R. 225) 
On the morning after the accident, Utah County Sheriff Sergeant Rex N. Murdock 
and Deputy Richard L. Healey followed two (2) sets of tracks from the location of the 
dead horse back to and up the driveway of the Erickson property. (R. 214). Witnesses at 
the scene of the accident reported seeing a dark colored mule running with the horse that 
was hit. (R. 214) After following the tracks to the Erickson property, Sergeant Murdock 
observed a dark mule in the pasture behind the Erickson home. (R. 214) 
Some time prior to the date of the accident in question, Shelby Taylor, a neighbor 
living near the Erickson property, helped capture a horse that had escaped from the 
Erickson pasture and was running unattended in the street. Mr. Taylor actually helped 
return the horse to the Erickson property. (R. 289) 
Roseman entered into a written agreement with Quinn Erickson on May 7, 1989 in 
which Erickson gave express permission for Roseman to keep his animals on Ericksonfs 
property upon the condition that Roseman (i) furnish feed when needed; and (ii) maintain 
the fence and gates. (R. 217) By the terms of this agreement, Roseman accepted full 
responsibility for the health and safety of his animals while on Ericksonfs property. (R. 
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217) 
The fence and gates, including the latch on the gate on the Erickson property were 
no different and were essentially in the same condition on the date of the accident as they 
were at the time of the taking of Roseman's deposition. (R. 218-19) 
Plaintiffs1 liability expert, Met Johnson, has previously been qualified as an expert 
at trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the case of Askew v. Hardman. Civil No. 
91-0400665, relating to an automobile accident involving a horse that had escaped from a 
fenced-in area. (R. 209-11) Prior to rendering an opinion in the present matter, Mr. 
Johnson was provided with and read the depositions of Defendants Roseman and 
Erickson. He personally interviewed Utah County Sheriff Sergeant Rex N. Murdock, and 
he visited the Erickson property where he personally examined the fencing and gates. (R. 
206-07) Mr. Johnson is of the opinion that the Roseman horse escaped through the gate 
at the end of the driveway of the Erickson property. (R. 198) The latch on the gate was 
so negligently constructed and maintained that the gate would not close securely and by 
merely bumping the gate the latch would come open and the gate by its own weight 
would swing open the width of "two refrigerators." (R. 204-05) While Mr. Johnson was 
inspecting the Erickson property, he twice saw the gate swing open after attempts to shut 
it. (R. 198, 203) 
During the winter months when the snow in the pasture was too deep for the 
animals to feed, Roseman would feed his horse with hay that he would keep on the 
outside side of the gate. (R. 221-22) The hay was placed such that a horse would likely 
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bump the gate as it attempted to reach over the gate to feed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly granted summary judgment in this matter because 
genuine issues of material fact are in dispute. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). If there is any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
opposing party. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co.. 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). 
Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn 
from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. I&. 
at 389. Under Rule 56, it is not always required that the party opposing summary 
judgment proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment against him. Rule 56(e) states 
specifically that a response in opposition to a motion must be supported by affidavits or 
other documents only in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. 
Where the party opposed to the motion submits no documents in opposition, the moving 
party may be granted summary judgment only "if appropriate," that is, if he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles. 
681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (quoting Olwell v. Clark 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case, the evidence in the record and the other documents submitted by 
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Plaintiffs in opposition to summary judgment demonstrate that Defendant Roseman owed 
a duty to Paulette Balle to use reasonable care to keep his horse from entering upon a 
highway. The evidence demonstrates that Roseman breached that duty in as much as he 
expressly assumed full responsibility to maintain the Erickson fence and gates to prevent 
his horse from escaping and he acted unreasonably under the circumstances. Further, the 
evidence shows that such breach of duty was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs, injury and 
Plaintiffs in fact suffered injury. Because Plaintiffs presented evidence to prove each and 
every element of the negligence claim, it was error for the trial judge to take the issues of 
negligence and breach of duty of care from the jury and rule as a matter of law that 
Defendant Roseman was not negligent and breached no duty to Paulette Balle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT DEFENDANT ROSEMAN WAS NOT NEGLIGENT, A 
QUESTION RESERVED FOR THE TRIER OF FACT. 
Following the oral argument and hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the 
trial court concluded that there was no showing that Defendant Roseman was negligent. 
Utah courts have repeatedly held that the issue of negligence is a question of fact for the 
determination by the jury. Determination of negligence becomes a question of law only 
when undisputed facts permit only one reasonable conclusion. Marquez v. Pepsi Cola 
Bottling Co. of Salt Lake City. 838 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
One of the disputed material facts at issue in this case is whether the horse 
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involved in the fatal collision with Paulette Balle was indeed the horse owned by 
Defendant Roseman. Defendant Roseman argued in support of his motion for summary 
judgment that Plaintiffs failed to show that he is the owner of the horse involved in the 
collision. (R. 191) Plaintiffs provided the trial court, however, with sufficient evidence 
for a jury to find that the horse involved in the accident was Defendant's horse. The 
morning after the November 19, 1991 accident, Utah County Sheriff Sergeant Rex 
Murdock and Deputy Richard Healey followed two sets of tracks from the location where 
the horse had been hit, back to and up the driveway of the Erickson property where 
Roseman's horse was being pastured. The tracks ended in front of the gate to the fenced 
area on the Erickson property. Mysteriously, Roseman's horse, which had been kept with 
a mule on the Erickson property "just disappeared" at this time. When asked in his 
deposition about the markings on a photo of the dead horse involved in the accident, 
Roseman admitted that his horse had "similar" markings and he indicated that there was 
nothing in the photo that made him think the horse involved in the accident was not his 
horse. (Addendum A) 
Plaintiffs realize that the mere showing that the horse involved in the collision was 
owned by Defendant Roseman is not sufficient. Additionally, Plaintiffs realize that Utah 
courts have long held that "[t]he mere happening of [an] accident. . . does not prove that 
the defendants were negligent." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Company, Inc.. 821 P.2d 458, 461 
(Utah. Ct. App. 1991), cert denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992) (quoting Horsleyv. 
Robinson. 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 (1947)). Rather, Plaintiffs must prove each 
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and every element of the negligence claim. In granting a motion for summary judgment, 
a trial judge must consider each element of the claim under the appropriate standard of 
proof. Celotex Coip. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 
265 (1986) (a party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of all 
essential elements of a claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 
202 (1986) (a party must prove a claim with clear and convincing evidence at the 
summary judgment stage if that is the burden required at trial); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (in evaluating 
whether summary judgment should be granted, we must take into consideration the 
eventual standard of proof for each element of the claim at trial on the merits). 
In a negligence action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing four elements: 
"that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that defendant breached the duty 
(negligence); that the breach of the duty was the proximate cause of plaintiff s injury; and 
that there was in fact injury." Kitchen at 461. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Coip.. 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), qffti., 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)). In 
this case, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38 (1953 as amended) creates a duty upon Defendant 
Roseman to use reasonable care to prevent his horse from entering upon a highway. 
Section 41-6-38 provides in part: 
(1) A person owning or in the possession or control of any livestock, may 
not willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or remain 
unaccompanied by a person in charge or control of the livestock upon a 
highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated 
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from the highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or 
building. 
The trial judge, in granting summary judgment in this matter, concluded that Defendant 
Roseman had no notice of any duty to act reasonably to prevent his horse from entering 
upon a highway unattended. The trial judge ruled that without notice, there could be no 
breach of duty. (R. 294) While the issue of whether a duty of care exists is a question of 
law to be determined by the court, see e.g., Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993), 
C.T. v. Martinez. 845 P.2d 246 (Utah 1992), the conclusion in this case that Roseman 
had no notice is clearly erroneous. Defendant Roseman entered into a written agreement 
with Defendant Quinn Erickson on May 7, 1989. (Addendum B) In this agreement, 
Erickson gave express permission for Roseman to keep his animals on Erickson's 
property upon the condition that Roseman (i) furnish feed when needed; and (ii) maintain 
the fence and gates. By the terms of this agreement, Roseman accepted full responsibility 
for the health and safety of his animals while on Ericksoris property. This responsibility 
included making certain the fence and gates would reasonably prevent his horse from 
escaping from its pasture and entering a highway. 
In addition, some time prior to the date of the accident, Shelby Taylor, a neighbor 
living near the Erickson property, personally helped capture a horse that had escaped 
from the Erickson property. While that horse was not one owned by Roseman, the prior 
escape provides evidence in the record that there was prior notice that the fence or gates 
were in a defective condition. It is therefore a question for the jury to determine whether, 
based upon this prior escape incident and the express terms of the pasturing agreement, 
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Roseman breached the duty to use reasonable care. 
POINT II 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY RULED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT DEFENDANT ROSEMAN DID NOT BREACH A DUTY OF 
CARE OWED TO PLAINTIFFS. SUCH A DETERMINATION IS A 
QUESTION FOR THE JURY AND CANNOT BE APPROPRIATELY 
DECIDED IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is clear that Defendant Roseman owed a duty of care to Paulette Balle. Most 
importantly, Plaintiffs must show that Roseman was negligent and breached that duty. 
This court has noted that "[a]s a general proposition, summary judgment is inappropriate 
to resolve a negligence claim on its merits, and should be employed 'only in the most 
clear-cut case.'" Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc.. 871 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994) (quoting Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 
P.2d 126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). Further, 
"[o]f particular concern is the precept that '[o]rdinarily, whether a defendant has breached 
the required standard of care is a question of fact for the jury.'" IgL at 575. (quoting 
Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982)). Accordingly, summary judgment is 
improper unless the standard of care can be determined as a matter of law, "and 
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under 
the circumstances." JJL "Summary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases." Doe v. Doe. 878 P.2d 1161, 1162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting 
Apache Tank Lines. Inc. v. Cheney. 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985)). 
The particular standard of care that Defendant Roseman owed Paulette Balle 
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cannot be determined as a matter of law, because "[t]he care to be exercised in any 
particular case depends upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of 
foreseeable danger involved and must be determined as a question of fact. Schreiter at 
575. (quoting DCR. Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983)). 
Accordingly, whether Defendant Roseman breached the required standard of care is a 
question for the jury, which cannot be appropriately decided in summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs1 
claim that Roseman was negligent. A reasonable mind could conclude that Roseman was 
negligent under the circumstances in allowing his horse to be pastured on property on 
which the gate to prohibit egress from the property would swing wide open if merely 
bumped. By written agreement with Erickson, Roseman agreed to be responsible for the 
safety of his own horse and to therefore accept responsibility for the fencing and gates on 
the Erickson property. As the owner of a horse, Defendant Roseman had the duty and 
responsibility to reasonably secure and pasture his horse. This responsibility was not 
abrogated when he pastured his horse on the Erickson property. 
The question of whether Roseman acted reasonably under the circumstances is a 
question of fact and should be reserved for the jury. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38 provides 
that Roseman had a duty to maintain a secure area for his horse to run unattended and to 
not negligently or willfiilly permit it to enter upon a highway. The latch on the gate was 
so insufficient that twice while Plaintiffs, expert, Met Johnson, was on the Erickson 
property the latch came undone and the gate came wide open. (Addendum C) This was 
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not only the condition of the gate and latch at the time it was inspected by Met Johnson, it 
was also the condition of the gate and latch at the time of the accident. 
The obvious insufficiency of the gate and latch was exacerbated by the fact that 
Roseman's horse was encouraged to bump against the gate to feed because Roseman 
stored his hay on the outside side of the gate. During the winter he would just throw the 
hay over the gate for his horse to eat. Met Johnson, Plaintiffs, expert, is of the opinion 
that placing feed next to the gate was a negligent act on the part of Roseman. Each of 
these acts of Defendant Roseman constitute genuine issues of material fact that a jury 
could reasonably conclude constitutes negligence and a breach of duty. Determination of 
negligence becomes a question of law only when undisputed facts permit only one 
reasonable conclusion. In this case, certainly more than one reasonable conclusion is 
possible. It is clearly a question for the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly granted summary judgment in this matter because 
genuine issues of material fact exist between the parties. Plaintiffs have presented a 
prima facie case for negligence against Defendant Roseman and have introduced 
sufficient evidence to carry the burden of persuasion on each element of the negligence 
claim. Summary judgment is only appropriate when no issues of material fact exist and 
the case can therefore be submitted as a matter of law. In ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment, all facts and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom 
14 
are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Generally, 
questions of negligence are questions to be left to a jury and only become questions of 
law when the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn. 
In this case, Plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that 
Defendant Roseman was negligent in the manner he pastured his horse. Utah law 
provides that the owner of a horse may not negligently permit his horse to enter a 
highway while unattended. The gate and latch on the Erickson property allowing egress 
from the pasture area was woefully insufficient in that the latch would often fail to secure 
the gate and the gate would fall open of its own weight. Bumping against the gate 
exacerbated this tendency and such bumping was encouraged by Defendant Roseman in 
that he stored hay and feed on the outside side of the gate. It is from this gate that 
Roseman's horse escaped and entered the highway causing the collision which resulted in 
the death of Paulette Balle. 
Wherefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court reverse the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment and remand to allow the issues of negligence and 
breach of duty to come before the jury, the proper finders of fact in this case. 
Dated this 1 day of ^-J>^oALjmT , 1995. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE: 
Bradley H. Parker 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
COPY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
• * • 
JOHN T. BALLE, an individual, 
ALISHA BALLE, AMBER BALLE, and 
JOHN T. BALLE as the parent 
and general guardian of AMIE 
BALLE, ASHLEE BALLE, ANDREA 
BALLE, ANJALEE BALLE, and 
AMANDA BALLE, minor children, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRYCE THOMAS, QUINN ERICKSON, 
and KEVIN ROSEMAN, 
Defendants. 
QUINN ERICKSON, 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs. 
KEVIN ROSEMAN/ 
Cross-Claim Defendant. 
* • * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of 
February, 1993, the deposition of KEVIN ROSEMAN was taken 
before Shelly Van Tassell, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
(License No. 321), Registered Professional Reporter and 
Notary Public, in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
* * * 
Reporter: Shelly Van Tassell 
REPORTERS V 
(801) 522-5742 5 DAY DELIVERYsl 
185 South State Street • Suite 380 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111J 
A s s o c i a t e d Meri t Reporters 
C i v i l No. 920400151 PI 
D e p o s i t i o n o f : 
KEVIN ROSEMAN 
c 
1 of '91 other that Mr- Erickson's? 
2 A Just behind my house. 
3 Q And when was that? 
4 A Part of October and probably part of November. 
5 She was at both places so I didn't have to chase her 
6 around. 
7 Q So when do you last recall seeing Dolly? 
8 A The first week or two in November. 
9 Q How old was Dolly? 
10 A Thirteen or fourteen. 
11 Q And you had owned her for how long? 
12 A Either nine or ten years. 
13 Q Had you ever taken Dolly to the vet? 
14 A Nope. 
15 Q Did Dolly have any identifying marks or 
16 characteristics? 
17 A No, not really. 
18 Q Did she have any scars on her hind legs that you 
19 recall? 
20 A Nope. 
21 Q That's no you don't recall, or no she didn't? 
22 A No, I don't believe she did. 
23 Q What about any special markings on her body, 
24 legs, forehead? Did she have any distinctive markings that 
25 I you recall? 
%
 >Z 
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Associated MERIT Reporters 
1 A Yes, just one. 
2 Q And what was that one? 
3 A £>he had like a little star on her forehead. 
4 Q flow, do you have any pictures that you took of 
5 ] Dolly while you owned Yier? 
6 A No. 
7 Q Well, I know in your answer to interrogatories 
8 and in your response to the request for production of 
9 documents s<?me pictures were produced. Do you know where 
10 those pictures came from? 
11 A J give them to him. That's what I say, I don't 
12 have them n<?w. 
13 Q And are those the only pictures that you had of 
14 Dolly, or d<? you have other pictures? 
15 A that's all I could find. 
16 MR. PARKER: Let me go off the record. 
17 (Off the record.) 
18 Q You say there was a star on her head. Can you 
19 be more specific about that mark? 
20 A No, just a star on her forehead. 
21 I (Whereupon Exhibit No. 1 was 
22 marked for identification.) 
23 Q Mr. Roseman, let me show you what has been 
24 marked as Deposition No. 1. That is a xerox picture of a 
25 horse. Doe3 that appear to you to be correct? 
Associated MERIT Reporters 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Is that Dolly? 
I don't know. 
1 
2 
3 
4 Q Compare the marking on the forehead of the horse 
5 in Exhibit 1 with the marking on Dolly. 
6 A They look similar. 
7 Q Would you describe the marking on Deposition 
8 Exhibit 1 as a star? 
9 A Not necessarily, but — 
10 Q From seeing the marking on the forehead, does 
11 that lead you to believe that the horse pictured in 
12 Deposition Exhibit 1 is Dolly? 
13 A It looks similar. 
14 Q Is there anything in looking at that that makes 
15 you think it isn't Dolly? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Now, there appears to be a halter on the horse; 
18 does there not? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Have you ever owned a blue halter? 
21 A Yeah, I'm sure I have. 
22 Q Since November of '91, have you been missing a 
23 halter? 
24 A Nope, not that I'm aware of. 
25 Q Do you still own a blue halter? 
* • ^ r 9 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
any? 
A 
Q 
A 
last name 
Q 
well, who 
A 
Trapp. 
Q 
horses? 
A 
Q 
anymore. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, 
From whom did you purchase Dolly? 
All I know is his last name was Peet. 
And that was nine or ten years ago? 
Yes. 
Who are the farriers you've used with Dolly, if 
The shoer? 
Yes. 
Teri Kirkham, Steve Winters, and the other boy's 
is Trapp. 
And who was the last one to shoe Dolly before — 
was the last one to shoe Dolly, that you know of? 
I'm not positive, but it may have been Ryan 
In November of 1991, did you own any other 
No, I don't believe so. 
Now, you stated that you don't own Dolly 
What happened to Dolly, if you know? 
I don't know. 
You didn't sell her? 
No. 
And she's just disappeared? 
Yes. 
^ 1 C < 7-to 
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1 Q The last time you saw her was sometime in the 
2 first two weeks of November of '91, to your recollection? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q And that was on the Quinn Erickson property? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did Dolly have a brand? 
7 A No. 
8 Q When you kept Dolly on the Erickson property, 
9 did you keep a halter on that property also? 
10 A No. Usually I hung it in my horse trailer. 
11 Q And your horse trailer was stored where? 
12 A At my house. 
13 Q Did you ever store a halter at the Erickson 
14 residence? 
15 A No. I keep them in my trailer. 
16 Q Would you leave a halter on Dolly when she was 
17 pastured at Erickson's? 
18 A Once in a while. 
19 Q Was there a halter that was just her halter that 
20 you normally used for her? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Ever use a blue halter on her? 
23 A Yeah. 
24 Q And, to your knowledge, since November of '91, 
25 the 1st of November of '91 on, are you missing a blue 
• v1 
Associated MERIT Reporters 
1 (Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 was 
2 marked for identification.) 
3 Q Mr. Roseman, let me show you what has been 
4 marked as Deposition Exhibit 2. Have you ever seen that 
5 document before? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q You saw it when the last deposition was being 
8 taken of Mr. Erickson, did you not? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Had you seen it before then? 
11 A Nope. 
12 Q That purports to be a drawing, I believe, of the 
13 Erickson property. Does it look like that to you? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Now, you indicated just a moment ago that when 
16 you would go and feed Dolly you'd throw hay over the back 
17 gate. And I'm just wondering — I notice on the property 
18 there's two gates, a thirteen-foot gate and a four-foot 
19 gate. Which gate would you throw the hay over? 
20 A The thirteen-foot gate. 
21 Q Did you store hay on the Erickson property? 
22 A Oh, sometimes I'd put three or four bales right 
23 there. The rest of the time I'd take it in my pickup. 
24 MR. SWENSON: For clarification, what do 
25 you mean by storing? Do you mean keep it there some place, 
24 
Associated MERIT Reporters '"* w'w 
1 or do you mean put it there in advance for this horse, or 
2 what are you asking? 
3 Q Well, let me just maybe clarify that. You 
4 indicated you might keep three or four bales close to the 
5 thirteen-foot gate; is that correct? 
6 A Yeah. 
7 Q And you might keep them there overnight or for a 
8 period of weeks, and then you'd periodically throw hay over 
9 the fence for Dolly to eat. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And that was generally all year around, or 
12 generally in the winter months? 
13 A Just when the snow was too deep. 
14 Q When you entered the property, would you enter 
15 through the four-foot gate or the thirteen-foot gate? 
16 A The four-foot gate. 
17 Q Tell me, if you can recall, what type of latch 
18 or locking mechanism, if any, is on the four-foot gate. 
19 A There isn't one on that one. 
20 Q That one just swings shut? 
21 A It is the one that leans in. He built it on a 
22 lean. 
23 Q So when you go in there and let it go it swings 
24 back shut? 
25 A Yeah, it's pretty heavy. And it stays shut. 
25 
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On the thirteen-foot gate, what type of latch is 
A wooden latch. 
And describe how that latch works, if you can. 
He's got a piece of wood you push down into a 
That's a latch — it's not a purchased metal 
No. 
1 Q 
2 there? 
3 A 
4 Q 
5 A 
6 latch. 
7 Q 
8 latch? 
9 A 
10 Q And that's located on which side of the gate, on 
11 the north side? 
12 A North side. 
13 Q Okay. Now, you mentioned that when you'd go to 
14 the Erickson property you'd also look over your fences; is 
15 that right? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Why would you do that? 
18 A I have ever since I was a kid. I grew up on a 
19 farm. I look for any trouble or any holes in the fence. 
20 Q Did you feel a special obligation or 
21 responsibility to look at the fences on the Erickson 
22 property? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And why was that? 
25 A My horse was there. 
26 
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1 Q Is the fence in good shape at present? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Is it in as good as shape now as it was in 
4 November of '91? 
5 A Yes, to my recollection. 
6 Q Would you say with repairs you've done it's even 
7 in better shape than it was in November of '91? 
8 A No, I wouldn't say it's any better. It's as 
9 good. 
10 Q Has there been any significant deterioration of 
11 the fencing since November of '91? 
12 I A No. 
13 Q Have you ever seen anyone else do repair on the 
14 fencing or maintenance? 
15 A No. 
16 Q. Are you aware if Mr- Erickson has ever done any 
17 repair or maintenance of the fencing? 
18 A No. 
19 Q Meaning no you don't believe he has? 
20 A No, I've never seen him. 
21 Q Other than the two gates that are shown on the 
22 Deposition Exhibit 2, the thirteen-foot gate and the 
23 four-foot gate, are there any other exits from the 
24 fenced-in property? 
25 A No. 
29 
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1 Q Are there any gaps or holes in the fence where a 
2 horse could get through or over? 
3 A No. 
4 Q And essentially that's pretty much the way it 
5 was in November of '91 also, correct? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Are the latches any different now than they were 
8 in November of '91? 
9 A No. 
10 Q Did you ever have anyone help you as you 
11 maintained or worked on the fencing? 
12 A No. 
13 Q Do you know John Balle? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Do you know who he is? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Have you ever met, or did you ever meet Paulette 
18 Balle? 
19 A No. 
20 Q Have you ever known any of the Balle children? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Have you ever talked with any of the Balles? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Have you ever told anyone that your horse, that 
25 Dolly was sold to someone in Mt. Pleasant? 
^13 30 
Associated Merit Reporters 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN T- BALLE, an individual; : 
ALISHA BALLE; AMBER BALLE, and : 
JOHN T. BALLE, as the parent and : 
general guardian of AMIE BALLE; : 
ASHLEE BALLE; ANDREA BALLE; : 
ANJALEE BALLE, and AMANDA BALLE, : 
minor children, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs • : 
BRYCE THOMAS; QUINN ERICKSON, 
and KEVIN ROSEMAN, 
Defendants. 
QUINN ERICKSON, 
Cross-Claimant, 
vs. 
KEVIN ROSEMAN, 
Cross-Claim Defendant. 
DEPOSITION OF: 
Met Johnson 
CIVIL NO. 920400151PI 
: Judge Ray M. Harding 
PURSUANT TO NOTICE, and on the 19th day 
of August, 1993, commencing at the hour of 11:15 a.m., 
the deposition of Met Johnson was taken in the offices 
of Parker, McKeown & McConkie, 4001 South 700 East, 
Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah, before Jill S. Nielsen, 
a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah. 
A c e Reporting, Inc. 
PO Box 2219 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2219 
(801)969-1952 
Jill S. Nielsen, RPR 
LICENSE NO 279 O 
^ a* ** 
EX. BY MR. SCHULTZ 
1 fences and give him my opinion as to what happened or how 
2 it happened or evaluate the circumstances for him. 
3 Q Okay. Do you act as a consultant for lawyers on 
4 a regular basis? 
5 A I try not to. 
6 Q Okay. Have you done it before? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And in what capacity? 
9 A Again, as an expert witness on — in the 
10 livestock matters. Usually it has to do with fence 
11 matters. 
12 Q Okay. Have you ever testified as an expert 
13 witness in court? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And when was that? 
16 A Well, many times. I owned the livestock market 
17 in Cedar City which I sold about five years ago, and 
18 "livestock matters" are, oh, differences of opinion between 
19 different parties, and the court would call me in to give 
20 an expert witness on values or conditions like this. So in 
21 those 20 years, fairly often. And in the last probably 
22 five or six years, it's been mostly on fence matters and 
23 those kind of things. The last time was -- I don't 
24 remember -- maybe a year and a half ago. 
25 Q When you say "on fence matters," what are you 
ii.* JL _I» 
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1 talking about? 
2 A When there's been circumstances that they needed 
3 to have someone who had a great deal of experience building 
4 and maintaining fence and/or especially I think because of 
5 my raising horses for as many years as my family has and I 
6 have, that they called on me to be the expert witness in 
7 those matters, 
8 Q Are you talking about cases where animals get 
9 out of a fence and there's a question about how that 
10 happened? 
11 A Exactly. 
12 Q Or if there was some kind of a problem with the 
13 fence? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q Okay. And can you tell me what court was the 
16 last one that you testified in regarding a case where an 
17 animal allegedly escaped from a fenced-in area? 
18 A It was in Provo. 
19 Q Okay. And who were you retained by? 
20 A I don't recall offhand, but — . 
21 Q Was it an attorney? 
22 A Oh, yes. 
23 Q Okay. Was it the plaintiff's attorney or the 
24 defendant's attorney? 
25 A It was the plaintiff's. 
8 
EXA BY MR. SCHULTZ 
1 Q Okay. And you cannot remember who the lawyer 
2 was? 
3 MR. PARKER: Off the record. 
4 (Discussion off the record.) 
5 Q It was the law firm Kimball, Parr? 
6 A That's correct. 
7 Q Out of Salt Lake City? 
8 A Correct. 
9 Q And did you testify in a trial — 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q — in that case? But the trial was held in 
12 Provo? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q Okay. Do you remember the name of the case? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Okay. What was the general issue involved, or 
17 what were the facts in the case? 
18 A An accident involving an automobile that a young 
19 lady was hurt severely in and a horse. 
20 Q Okay. And you testified on behalf of the young 
21 lady? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q And did you come to some conclusion that there 
24 was a problem with a fence in that case? 
25 A Yes. 
*.* \s *J 
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1 Q Was your deposition taken in that case? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Do you have a copy of it? 
4 A I don't, 
5 Q Can you remember any other cases that you've 
6 testified in where there's been an automobile accident 
7 involving an animal where you were asked to give an opinion 
8 regarding how the animal got to where it was or a problem 
9 with the fence? 
10 A Not in court• 
11 Q Okay- In a deposition? 
12 A In a deposition. 
13 Q Okay. Can you give me the name of any other 
14 attorneys you've been retained by for that type of a case 
15 where you've been deposed? 
16 A I don't recall the name of the attorney. Hold 
17 on just a minute. Their offices are just across the street 
18 from like the Market Street Grill. 
19 Q Don Purser? 
20 A Don Purser, yes. 
21 Q And in that case was Don Purser representing the 
22 plaintiff or the defendant? 
23 A Defendant. 
24 Q And your deposition was taken in that case? 
25 A That's correct. 
1.D3 
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1 Q All right. Do you hold yourself out as an 
2 expert witness, then, or an expert, I should say, in 
3 fencing? Is that the area? 
4 A Fencing and horses and cattle behavior, yes. 
5 Q Okay. Are you familiar with anybody else who is 
6 an expert in that area? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Okay. And is your knowledge or skill or 
9 whatever you want to call it in that area, is that based on 
10 anything other than hands-on experience as a rancher? 
11 A I took a variety of agriculture classes in 
12 college, but mostly I think it•s because of my — my realm 
13 of work. 
14 Q Okay. Are you familiar with any books, 
15 pamphlets or other written material that deal with this 
16 subject matter? 
17 A No. 
18 Q What information have you been given in this 
19 case to review as part of your evaluation? 
20 A I think two depositions, police report, 
21 photographs. 
22 Q Whose depositions were they? 
23 A Erickson and Roseman. 
24 Q And you read those? 
25 A Yes. 
11 
AM BY MR- SCHULTZ 
1 Q And what photographs were you given? 
2 A This booklet (indicating), 
3 Q This is a booklet from when you went down to the 
4 property? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q And these are photographs that were taken there? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And anything else other than the police report? 
9 A I don't think so. 
10 Q Okay. Now, other than reviewing those 
11 materials, what other information have you been given 
12 regarding the case? 
13 A I haven't been given any except by the people 
14 that I have spoken to. 
15 Q Okay. 
16 A And Officer — . 
17 Q Who have you talked to? 
18 A He runs the animal shelter, I think, by Provo, 
19 but I've forgotten his name. 
20 Q Murdock? 
21 A Murdock, Mr. Murdock. 
22 Q When did you talk to him? 
23 A I think, oh, maybe April, May. 
24 Q Of '93? 
25 A '93. 
12 
XAM BY MK. bLtlULTZ, 
1 then we went and took different pictures of different items 
2 that could be of some significance. 
3 Q And were you specifically looking at this area 
4 to see if you could find any explanation for how a horse 
5 could get out of that pasture? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Okay. Did you form any conclusions in that 
8 regard? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And what were your conclusions? 
11 A My conclusions are that there1s negligence with 
12 the way the latch was constructed, and when we get to the 
13 photographs, I can show you. I'd be happy to show you now. 
14 Q First just tell me what your conclusions are. 
15 You said you thought there was something negligent about 
16 how the latch was constructed? 
17 A Yes, the latch and the keeper both. 
18 Q The latch on which gate? 
19 A Especially on — let's, for all intents and 
20 purposes, call it the large one or the 13-foot one. 
21 Q Okay. The large one? 
22 A Or the one that swings in, whichever one you 
23 want. 
24 Q It's a 13-foot gate — 
25 A I'm not sure, but it's the wide one, the big 
29 
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1 the winter, as was stated in the depositions, then that was 
2 negligence. 
3 The halter being left on the horse in especially 
4 the — that pasture with the rubbish and the old vehicles 
5 and the trash and so many things that the halter could be 
6 hooked over was negligence in the care of the horse. 
7 The way that the latch was constructed with — I 
8 think there's a hook on it on one side -- woops — on the 
9 bottom side I put it. And if I recall, there's a bolt 
10 probably used as a handhold. Those are both features that 
11 a halter could be hooked on, or a horse even bumping it 
12 could -- the negligence in the construction of the gate, 
13 bumping the gate if the keeper is not — even if it's all 
14 the way down, if it's bumped hardly or bumped securely or 
15 severely or if even bumped a little, if the feed were put 
16 closely enough to the fence -- pardon me -- to the gate on 
17 the other side, then horses would tend to reach for that 
18 and their pushing motion would rattle that gate loose. 
19 In the construction of the gate, the gate was 
20 constructed so if it were unlatched by any means or left 
21 unlatched, it would fall open to the -- to the width, I 
22 would say, of — I'll use two refrigerators because we 
23 actually photographed how far it would fall open. 
24 Q Did you measure how far it fell open? 
25 A I don't think — I don't recall that we measured 
31 
1 made of wood, and it has a great deal of weight. It will 
2 pull against this if this isn't in its position. In fact, 
3 it did that two or three times when Mr. — whose place is 
4 this? 
5 Q Erickson? 
6 A Erickson. Okay. When we were there at 
7 Mr. Erickson*s place, we went out of that gate a couple 
8 times with him. Well, you were there, too, I think. That 
9 very thing happened. As we walked off, it fell open again 
10 and he went back and pushed it down again to close it. 
11 So it's a normal thing that this does. This 
12 keeper -- wow — this latch, if it isn't forced into the 
13 keeper severely or securely, it will happen just like you 
14 saw it that day. It just comes open again. 
15 Q Okay. Is there any evidence that you are aware 
16 of, any witness, any investigating officer, anybody, who 
17 .has provided any information as to what condition the latch 
18 was in in relationship to the keeper on the day of the 
19 accident? 
20 A Not to my knowledge. 
21 Q Okay. So how, in your opinion, did this gate 
22 come open, if that is your opinion? Is it your opinion 
23 that that gate came open and that the horse got out? 
24 A That's my strongest opinion of this whole thing, 
25 is that gate came open or was bumped open, and/or was — 
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1 the halter was hooked into it or the rear end or the front 
2 shoulder bumped either one of these in an upward motion, or 
3 the horses may have been fighting over the hay that could 
4 have been fed even on this side, and turning around could 
5 have bumped it. 
6 Bumping or straining either one of these in an 
7 upward motion would have done it. Bumping the gate would 
8 have rattled this so this could have come up as it's 
9 slanted out as this is drawn. Any bumping could make that 
10 move up. 
11 So there are five or six alternatives of how 
12 that could have come free by an animal, either from his 
13 body and/or from especially the halter. 
14 Q Okay. But we don't have any facts to support 
15 that any of that stuff happened, do we? 
16 MR. PARKER: You mean witnesses? 
17 A Like witnesses? 
18 Q Witnesses or anything. 
19 MR. HOLLAND: Physical evidence. 
20 Q Any evidence whatsoever that corroborates those 
21 various possibilities that you just stated. 
22 A Not on that night, but I did see it happen that 
23 very day that we were all there. 
24 Q What, you saw a horse bump up against it? 
25 A Not a horse, but this not being latched securely 
44 
1 and the gate fell open. 
2 Q Are there any other possibilities that you have 
3 other than what you just identified as to how this gate 
4 could have come open? 
5 A Not particularly. 
6 Q Would you agree, Mr. Johnson, that your theory 
7 about how a horse could get out of that pasture, when you 
8 aPPly it to what you know about that night when this 
9 accident happened, that you're really just speculating? 
10 A I'm pretty convinced that that — that any one 
11 of those things happened because of the negligence of the 
12 way this whole thing was constructed. I owned a livestock 
13 market at Cedar City. Did I — has that been mentioned? 
14 MR. HOLLAND: Yes. 
15 Q Yes. 
16 A And we handled like from thirty to 50,000 head 
17 of livestock every year for 20 years. The thousands of 
18 horses that I've raised and been around, you get to know 
19 them as well as you know any species that you could, and 
20 when you see elements of construction like this, it throws 
21 up a red flag in a hurry that — that it limits it to the 
22 options in a big hurry. 
23 Their behavior is pretty predictable, and so is 
24 the maintenance and/or the construction of the facilities. 
25 You get to know after that much time what works and what 
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1 what you're saying about the gate and the problems with the 
2 gate. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q All I want to do is, is there anything else that 
5 you, in your opinion, in your area of training, see as a 
6 negligent act that contributed to cause the horse to get 
7 out of the pasture? 
8 A Well, the placement of the hay that's been 
9 referred to is a negligent act in>having it apparently 
10 close enough to the gate that the horses will attempt to 
11 reach over it. That will be one that has been mentioned, 
12 but I'll summarize all of them. 
13 Q And do you have any information to indicate that 
14 there was, in fact, hay placed in that area on the outside 
15 of the gate on the day of the accident? 
16 A Only that we saw very old hay where it had been 
17 stacked. 
18 Q Did the officer say he saw any hay stacked in 
19 that area when he went up there the next morning after the 
20 accident? 
21 A I don't believe that I asked him that guestion. 
22 Q Okay. And he didn't tell you that, did he? 
23 A I don't believe so. 
24 Q All right. Anything else, now, that we haven't 
25 gone over that you think is a causal relationship to 
51 
1 A Oh, I'm sure I have. I mean, the answer is yes. 
2 I can't be specific, but I'm sure I have. 
3 Q And this oftentimes happens especially during 
4 hunting season, does it not, oftentimes? 
5 A Well, hunters have a reputation for doing that, 
6 yes. 
7 Q Okay. I just need you to give me some 
8 information. Does the gate swing only one direction, swing 
9 in or swing out, or does it swing both ways? 
10 A No, it swings only in to the pasture. 
11 Q So a horse pushing on it would close the gate, 
12 would it not, on the gate? 
13 A It would push the gate closed, yes, to the 
14 closed position. The problem with that is if this is not 
15 secure, any rattling will make this latch move up and out 
16 as it's pushed and pushed and pushed again. That would 
17 continue to climb until it was totally released if it 
18 weren't properly latched. 
19 Q Right. At least on the date that you saw it, it 
20 would have that effect? 
21 A I can only substantiate that by the gentleman 
22 who said it hadn't been touched or repaired since the date 
23 of the accident, so what I saw is what I saw, and that's 
24 what he said. 
25 Q Okay. You talked about ground. When ground is 
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1 Q Now, you indicated that sometimes the latch, 
2 when you set it, it wouldn't close; is that correct? 
3 A Correct, 
4 Q And what do you base that opinion on? 
5 A Well, one time when I tried the gate, which 
6 means perform that latch exercise, it didn't go down far 
7 enough, it came undone and fell away. The other time when 
8 Mr. Erickson and I and I think maybe a couple others went 
9 in, he reached over the gate, put)the latch down, and it 
10 didn't go far enough and it did the same thing as when I 
11 did it, it popped out and fell open again. 
12 Q You've been asked some questions about how the 
13 horses could have possibly escaped from the field. Do you 
14 have an opinion as to how they probably escaped from the 
15 field? 
16 A Well, as I stated before, in my opinion, the 
17 probability is that they came out the gate area. I mean, 
18 without a doubt, that's — well, that's where the tracks 
19 led to, and that's my opinion. 
20 MR. SCHULTZ: I object to that. It lacks 
21 foundation, and I would move to strike it. 
22 Q Well, let me ask you this: Is any part of that 
23 opinion based on the information you obtained from 
24 Sergeant Murdock as to where, at least in his opinion, the 
25 animals were tracked to? 
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ADDENDUM D 
41-6-38 MOTOR VEHICLES 
formation to disclose the cause, conditions then existing, and the persont 
and vehicles involved in the traffic accident. 
(2) Every accident report requested under Section 41-6-35 shall be made In 
writing and on the appropriate form approved by the department. It shall 
contain all of the information required that is available. 
(3) (a) The department shall suspend the license or permit to operate i 
vehicle and any nonresident operating privileges of any person failing to 
report an accident as requested under Section 41-6-35 until the report has 
been filed. 
(b) The department may extend the suspension, not to exceed 30 days. 
(c) Any person convicted of failing to make a report under Section 
41-6-35 is punishable under Section 41-6-12. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 27; C. 1943, sections (1) and (3), substituted "law enforce-
57-7-104; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, ment agencies" for "police departments" m 
§ 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 9; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, Subsection (l)(a), substituted "Section 41-6-12" 
§ 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 29; 1993, ch. 234, § 31. for "Section 41-6-164" in Subsection (3)(c),and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- made a stylistic change, 
ment, effective July 1, 1993, subdivided Sub-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles * 43. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles c= 10. 
41-6-38. Livestock on highway — Restrictions — Collision, 
action for damages. 
(1) A person owning or in the possession or control of any livestock, may not 
willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or remain unac-
companied by a person in charge or control of the livestock upon a highway, 
both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated from the 
highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or building. This sub-
section does not apply to range stock drifting onto any highway in going to or 
returning from their accustomed ranges. 
(2) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or across any highway 
during the period from half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sun-
rise, without keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning lights on 
continual duty to open the road to permit the passage of vehicles. 
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator, or occupant of a 
motor vehicle or by their personal representatives or assignees, or by the 
owner of the livestock for damages caused by collision with any domestic 
animal or animals on a highway, there is no presumption that the collision 
was due to negligence on behalf of the owner or the person in possession of 
livestock. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 28; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Livestock highways, 
57-7-105; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 30. fc 27-12-117 et seq. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
No presumption provision. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section and § 4-25-8 do not unconstitu-
tionally discriminate among similarly situated 
plaintiffs in actions involving unrestricted 
livestock merely because each provision im-
poses a different burden of proving liability. 
The legislature reasonably could have con-
cluded that people's interest in the crops, 
fences and even personal security on their own 
land is both greater and different in kind than 
travelers' interest in safety on the highway. 
Vaderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
No presumption provision. 
This provision is clear and unambiguous and 
in an action where plaintiffs motorcycle col-
lided with a horse on a highway, it means that 
there is no presumption that the defendant was 
guilty in permitting the horses to be upon the 
highway under the conditions that were found 
there and the burden rests upon the plaintiff to 
establish acts of negligence. Hyrum Smith Es-
tate Co. v. Peterson, 227 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 
1955). 
Trial court properly directed verdict for de-
fendant owner of horse struck by vehicle, since 
under this section the mere fact defendant's 
horses escaped from enclosure was not suffi-
cient to justify submitting defendant's negli-
gence to jury. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 
375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
Cited in Hornsby v. Corporation of Presid-
ing Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
A.L.R. — Liability for damage to motor ve-
hicle or injury to person riding therein from 
collision with runaway horse, or horse left un-
attended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653. 
Liability of governmental entity for damage 
to motor vehicle or injury to person riding 
therein resulting from collision between vehi-
cle and domestic animal at large in street or 
highway, 52 A.L.R.lth 1200. 
Liability for killing or injuring, by motor ve-
hicle, livestock or fowl on highway, 55 
A.L.R.4th 822. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles ^ 10. 
41-6-38,5. Peace officer investigating accident to notify 
owner if livestock or broken fence involved — 
Exempt from liability. 
(1) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in injury or death of 
any livestock shall make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the 
owner of the livestock and inform the owner of the injured or dead animal. 
(2) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in a broken fence, if 
it appears the fence contains or controls the movement of livestock, shall 
make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the owner of the property 
and inform the owner of the broken fence. 
(3) Civil or criminal liability for claims does not arise against any peace 
officer for failure to locate the owner of the livestock or property. This subsec-
tion does not preclude disciplinary action by the department against a peace 
officer for failure to perform duties required by this section. 
History: C 1953, 41-6-38.5, enacted by L. 
1W5, ch. 127, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 31. 
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